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I. INTRODUCTION
Although it values preparatory introspection, the literature on interest-
based negotiation focuses especially on negotiation with others. But,
figuratively speaking, we each continuously negotiate with ourselves i as we
negotiate with others who are doing the same. I aim to name, explain, and
systematize "wiggle room," a phenomenon that lies within these linked self-
negotiations.
Consider the following thought experiment. You are a plaintiff
negotiating the settlement of a civil lawsuit. Before settlement talks began a
year ago, you decided you would not accept less than $2 million. This
threshold is what some would call your "reservation value," traditionally
defined as the least you are willing to accept--or, if on the other side of the
bargaining table, the most you are willing to give. 2 Suppose you arrived at
this $2 million figure through careful analysis, including your lawyer's
estimations of the probabilities of various possible verdicts. This accounted
for all conceivable contingencies, benefits, and costs, along with your
preferences, biases, and needs. Then, six months ago, you discovered some
new evidence and shared it with defense counsel. It led you to recalibrate
your reservation value to $2.5 million, but defense said their last best offer is
$2.49 million. Since then, nothing has changed. Today, your case will be
heard in court, and you are walking up the courthouse steps. All posturing
aside, would you settle for less than your new reservation value?
*CEO of Adroit Productions, LLC, a company that assists dispute resolution
professionals. For their feedback on drafts, I thank Dafna Alsheh, Max Bazerman, Amy
Cohen, Blake Emerson, Patrick Field, John Forester, Stephen Goldberg, Janet Martinez,
Robert McKersie, Leonard Riskin, G. Richard Shell, Guhan Subramanian, Lawrence
Susskind, Michael Wheeler, and the editorial team at JDR. Any remaining flaws owe
only to my own oversight or stubbornness.
I See generally GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMIcS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF
SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON (1992); GEORGE AINSLIE,
BREAKDOWN OF WILL 73-142 (2001).
2 E.g., HOwARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION: How To RESOLVE
CONFLICTS AND GET THE BEST OUT OF BARGAINING 45 (1982) [hereinafter RAIFFA, THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION].
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From personal experience in legal and extralegal contexts, we know that
we sometimes cross a line we drew in the sand. People can sometimes be
dragged past their reservation value, agreeing to a deal or agreement that
does not meet it, much less surpass it. I call this possibility "wiggle room,"
and acceptance of an agreement that fails to meet one's reservation value
"wiggling."
This paper will not try to prove that wiggling happens or argue whether it
is advisable. I will begin instead with an overview of what the interest-based
negotiation literature has to say about wiggling. There, I will dwell on the
tension between Howard Raiffa and Roger Fisher's treatments of reservation
values. Raffia's treatment is more enthusiastic; Fisher's, leery. I will stake
out the middle ground as I develop a quantitative and graphical model of
wiggle room. To do that, we will need an adequate vocabulary, so I will start
by re-examining keystone concepts of negotiation analysis, recasting some in
light of wiggle room's occasional existence-a fact these concepts have so
far ignored. I will then mount what appears to be the first systematic and
thorough examination of wiggle room's causes within the context of
negotiation, drawing especially from psychology, negotiation analysis, and
behavioral economics. I will collect and induce predictions about which
tactics are likely to be the most effective at creating wiggle room during
distributive bargaining, as well as offer advice about how, if desired, we can
help steel ourselves against the temptation to wiggle. In the process, I will
highlight anything that confirms or disproves the tacit and explicit
assumptions I surface in Fisher's and Raiffa's respective lines of thought.
1I. PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW
The interest-based negotiation literature is already well-aware of
recalibrations like the considered shift, in the thought experiment, from $2
million to $2.5 million-in light of new events, information, or strategic
moves at or away from the table, negotiators might need to recalibrate their
reservation value.3 New offers, changes in perception, and threats are a few
such occasions. 4 Wiggle room pertains not to your recalibration from $2
3 E.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBEN1US, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 120-21 (1986) [hereinafter LAX
& SEBENIUS, MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR]; DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3D
NEGOTIATION: POWERFUL TOOLS TO CHANGE THE GAME IN YOUR MOST IMPORTANT
DEALS 81-90 (2006) [hereinafter LAX & SEBENIUS, 3D NEGOTIATION].
4 LAX & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 120.
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million to $2.5 million due to the important new evidence, though, but to
whether you would accept $2.49 million on the courthouse steps, all other
things being equal. What is the difference?
One factor that distinguishes wiggle room is the span of its cause's
effects. In the thought experiment, the new evidence meaningfully (even if
not uniformly) impacts the state of play for all parties. If exasperation is what
leads you to capitulate on the courthouse steps, that is wiggling, because it
was not caused by something that impacted the state of play for everyone in
the same way as the new evidence. Another distinguishing factor is whether
information that causes recalibration can be classed as a kind of hearsay,
bluff, or say-so. Suppose that on the courthouse steps the defense presents
only good acting skills, drawing upon an aggressive mien, strong language,
unsubstantiated claims that you have no attractive alternatives, and
unsubstantiated threats about how willing they are to try the case. If that is
what leads you to accept less than your reservation value, you wiggled. In
this sense, some instances of wiggling are a subset of recalibration.
Some of what I want to call wiggling is less deliberate than
"recalibration" would suggest. A buyer at an auction who impulsively blurts
out a number above his reservation value without thinking wiggled. So
wiggling and recalibration are like overlapping Venn diagrams. Indeed, I am
not sure it is possible to distinguish every kind of situation that counts as
wiggling, but I hope the two constraints above are enough to prevent the
concept from being so broad as to be trivial. With this refined definition in
mind, we can resume the literature review with sharper focus.
The negotiation literature's treatment of what I am calling wiggle room
can be divided into descriptions and prescriptions. The descriptive account is
scattered. Raiffa et al. mention wiggling hypothetically5 and anecdotally 6 as
an interesting anomaly. They also admit that for negotiations over packages
of issues, reservation values might be a range of values rather than just one.7
Lax and Sebenius mention that in practice, "reservation values and
aspirations sometimes have a lot of give" 8 because (1) they can depend partly
on counterparts' reservation values and aspirations, about which we are often
uncertain, and (2) experiments on psychological "limits" suggest "'a
5 HowARD RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 167-68, 274 (2002) [hereinafter RAIFFA ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS].
6 1d. at 119.
7 Id. at 222.
8 LAX & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 135.
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bargainer without a limit [i.e., reservation value] seems totally plausible,
especially in the early phases of the negotiation.' 9"'10 Wiggle room has to do
with the violation of reservation values that were clearly defined, though, not
with those that were undefined in the first place. Thompson has offered a few
definitions of something she calls agreement bias. It appears to refer to some
parties' tendency-one confirmed by Pinkley, Neale, and Bennettl -to
accept agreements worse than their best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA), not necessarily their reservation value. 12 However, White and
Neale discuss exactly what I am calling wiggle room, 13 and Wheeler
suggests that some negotiations in professional sports practically assume it. 14
I will review their input when I catalogue wiggle room's possible causes.
Outside of the negotiation literature, one concept that should not be
confused with wiggle room is what Herbert Simon called satisficing. That is
when, due to their bounded rationality, decisionmakers settle on suboptimal
decisions that merely suffice because they meet known criteria or a
predecided threshold. 15 Wiggle room involves accepting agreements that do
9 DEAN G. PRuiTr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 27 (1981).
10 LAx & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 135.
11 Robin L. Pinkley et al., The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic
Negotiation, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 97, 110-12
(1994). This study's data is not available for re-analysis. Email from Robin Pinkley,
Professor at the Edwin L. Cox School of Business, to Noah Susskind, author (Mar. 30,
2010, 20:18 EST) (on file with author).
12 See LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 5, 230 (4th
ed. 2008) [hereinafter THOMPSON, MIND AND HEART]; LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE TRUTH
ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS: "CRACK THE CODE, AND USE IT WITH ANYONE AT ANY TIME..."
25 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter THOMPSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS]; Taya
Cohen et al., The Agreement Bias in Negotiation: Teams Facilitate Impasse, IACM 23rd
Annual Conference Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-1612404. The
last-mentioned also overlooks the plausible possibility that "agreement bias" is just as
prevalent among team-members as it is across the bargaining table. Email from
Lawrence Susskind, Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to Noah
Susskind, author (Aug. 12, 2010, 17:07 EST) (on file with author).
13 Sally Blount White & Margaret A. Neale, Reservation Prices, Resistance Points,
and BATNAs: Determining the Parameters of Acceptable Negotiated Outcomes, 7
NEGOTIATION J. 379, 379 (1991).
14 Michael Wheeler, First, Let's Kill All the Agents!, in NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF
OTHERS: ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS,
POLITICIANS, AND EVERYBODY ELSE 235 (Robert H. Mnookin et al. eds., 1999).
15 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 295-98 (1984).
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not even meet our predecided threshold. More relevant but less well-known
is a philosophical essay by Donald Davidson investigating the assumptive
and future-oriented nature of intention. 16 Most relevant is an array of
research studies on the psychology of choice-making, decisions, persuasion,
biases, and-a topic somewhat underexplored by the negotiation field-self-
control. I will help unfold this descriptive line of thought into a unified
theory of wiggle room within the context of negotiation analysis.
In terms of prescriptions about whether one should ever wiggle, the
literature is discordant. There is a tension between two of the founding
teacher-practitioners of the interest-based negotiation tradition. In one camp,
advising against wiggling, are Howard Raiffa and some of his former
Harvard Business School students like Max Bazerman and James Sebenius. 17
To understand what they had to say about wiggling, we need to backtrack to
their account of how reservation values should be formed and used in the
first place.
The first stage in determining your reservation value, Raiffa would say,
is to start by creating a template for yourself.' 8 The template should list
possible resolutions to each of the issues or facets of the deal or dispute being
negotiated, and assign them subjective expected utility values. These ranges
should be bounded by what look, from your perspective, like the best and
worst possible scenarios for each issue.
With this template in hand, he says, you can begin the following process.
Imagine the least desirable agreement that could result from the negotiation.
You would probably prefer your BATNA rather than that outcome. Now
suppose that hypothetical settlement were a little more favorable to you in
regards to one or more of the constitutive issues. How does it compare to
your BATNA? As you slightly "sweeten" this hypothetical settlement
repeatedly, he says, keep weighing it against your BATNA, asking yourself
if you would still rather revert to your BATNA.19 You are looking for the
point at which you are indifferent between the package under consideration
and the BATNA. When you get to that indifference point, stop. You have
16 DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83-102 (2001).
17 See MAx H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 68
(1992); LAX & SEBENIUS, 3D NEGOTIATION, supra note 3, at 86-90; DEEPAK MALHOTRA
& MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS: HOW TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES AND
ACHIEVE BRILLIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND BEYOND 20-21 (2008);
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 45; RAIFFA ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 101.
18 RAIFFA ET AL. NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 213.
19 Id. at 222.
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arrived at your reservation value. This template now allows you to evaluate,
mid-negotiation, various packages, tradeoffs, and even your overall
reservation value. 20 They admit that a party's reservation value might be a
range instead of a point, which "may be all the accuracy we may need in
practice."21 And, they add that this template conversion process can help you
rank your "interests" before you negotiate.22 (Of course, they mean
"interests" in the classic Getting To Yes sense-the ends you want, as
opposed to a "position" you take about a means to getting them.)23
Once in direct dialogue with the other parties, Raiffa says, you will want
to keep your reservation value in mind as you consider potential
settlements.24 But you should also keep in mind your interests. He says,
"Somehow everything should be referred back to how well each composite
bundle fares in terms of the fundamental interests (objectives) of our
decisionmaker and how important those interests are." 25 Raiffa claims that a
formalization of that comparison is possible, although he resists doing so in
print.26 Raiffa goes on to say, "[My coauthors and I] like to think that
template analysis need not inhibit creativity. Ideally there should be interplay
between it and analysis. Make a template, but don't treat it as sacred. Be
willing to play around with it."27
I think some explicit and implicit ideas and assumptions informing this
treatment of how negotiators set and use a reservation value are: (1)
cognition precedes behavior-a negotiator's interests are static and
discoverable (at least to herself), so barring any reprioritization of interests
during template creation, self-discovery and self-analysis about interests will
not follow the negotiation; (2) using a template, negotiators can quantify the
subjective expected utility of their BATNA and potential deals to a workably
accurate degree without inhibiting creativity or impairing their ability to
adapt to new information; (3) negotiators should, in some circumstances,
perform this quantification because doing so will help them; (4) "setting" a
reservation value is a hypothetical and comparative process consisting of
20 Id.
21 Id. at 222.
22Id. at 214.
23 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATrON, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-41 (2d ed. 1991).
24 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 222.
25 Id.
2 6 Id.
27 Id at 220.
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weighing the subjective expected utility of a BATNA with increasingly
embellished hypothetical deals until an indifference point is discovered; and
(5) wiggling is a mistake.
A second camp is represented by two other venerable luminaries, Roger
Fisher and William Ury. They too believe that assenting to a negotiated
consensus should help execute your interests, not discover them. In service of
this end, though, they do not recommend converting BATNAs into
reservation values: "[The BATNA] is the standard against which any
proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can
protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from
rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept."28
So for Fisher and Ury, just as for Raiffa et al., deals under discussion
should be imagined on one side of the scale, and your interests should be the
fulcrum. But here, Fisher and Ury say BATNAs, and not reservation values,
are what you should place on the other side of this hypothetical scale. Why?
It "is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that
are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to
accept."'29 They say that a reservation value, while conveniently instructive in
one sense: (1) inhibits adaptive learning, leading you to "shut your ears,
deciding in advance that nothing the other party says could cause you to raise
or lower that bottom line";30 (2) inhibits creativity during the deal-crafting
process; 31 and (3) is likely to be set arbitrarily high, anchored on your ideal
agreement 32 (what Walton and McKersie called your "target"). 33 Fisher and
Ury do say you might want to formulate a "trip wire," a hypothetical point
within the potential range of offers and demands where you would pause to
reconsider the direction things are going. But they mean for this to be a
reminder, not a restriction.
I think the explicit and implicit ideas and assumptions at work in this
treatment of reservation values are: (1) cognition precedes behavior-a
negotiator's interests are static and discoverable (at least to herself), and self-
discovery and self-analysis about interests will not follow the negotiation; (2)
negotiators cannot reliably translate BATNAs into reservation values without
28 FISHER ET AL., supra note 23, at 100.
2 9 Id.
30 Id. at 98.
31 Id. at 98-99.
32 Id. at 99.
33 RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSiE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM 42 (2d ed. 1991).
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running too great a risk of (a) anchoring on target values, (b) inhibiting
creativity in the deal-making process, or (c) shutting their ears to game-
changing information; (3) negotiators should not attempt such a translation
from a BATNA to a reservation value; (4) setting a reservation value is a
comparative and hypothetical exercise; and (5) wiggling, by definition, could
happen only if you set a reservation value, which is a mistake.
To sum up, both camps believe negotiation should include a hypothetical
comparison between potential agreements and interests. Fisher and Ury
would stick to BATNAs, while Raiffa et al. think BATNAs can be fruitfully
converted to reservation values. Even though Raiffa describes a process of
reservation-value creation that anchors off of BATNAs, Fisher and Ury fear
that negotiators will anchor off of target values instead. Fisher and Ury fear
that reservation values will prevent negotiators from recalibrating, but Raiffa
et al. fear a BATNA will lead to imprecision.
III. REVIEW OF RELEVANT ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND TERMS
Some well-worn definitions at the heart of quantitative negotiation
analysis, including many I have already mentioned, operate as if no one
wiggles. As I organize, critique, and supplement them, I will refer to an
example of a two-party distributive negotiation over one quantifiable issue-
the sale of one widget from a seller, s, to a buyer, b.
The least the seller is willing to accept is known to many as the seller's
"reservation value" (RV), which by convention I will denote as s.34
Similarly, the buyer's reservation value, b, is commonly defined as the most
he is willing to give in the negotiation. 35 Some who once used the term
"reservation price" instead have since moved away from this term,
presumably because it fails to capture nonmonetary issues as well, 36.
"Bottom line" has also been used,37 even though that phrase can be confused
with its other meanings. And, like "walk-away point"38 and "resistance
point, '39 two other terms commonly considered synonymous with
34 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 110-11.
35 Id.
36 Compare BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 17, at 68, with MALHOTRA &
BAZERMAN, supra note 17, at 20-2 1.
37 FISHER ET AL., supra note 23, 98-100.
38 MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 17, at 37.
39 WALTON & McKERSIE, supra note 33, at 41.
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reservation value, "bottom line" conjures a descriptively inaccurate image of
a reservation value.
None of these customary terms and definitions for the least (or most) a
negotiator is willing to take (or give) accurately describe reality. A
reservation value is not necessarily, as custom would have it, the threshold
for what a negotiator is willing to accept per se, just what he or she intends
that threshold to be.40 The negotiator might wiggle. In this way, custom
falsely renders a rationalistic prescription for negotiating behavior as a
description of that behavior.41 Reservation values are better expressed as
perceptions of one's threshold, not as the threshold itself.
Equipped with this proposed amendment to the definiendum of
reservation value and its ilk, we can organize and add to the taxonomy of
reservation values, edging still closer to a precise definition of wiggle room.
To begin with, we might have a reservation value for a single issue or for
a whole package of issues up for discussion. 42 Let us call a reservation value
that a party conscientiously decides for itself a "self-determined reservation
value." A party's best guess as to what another party's self-determined
reservation value is could be called something like an "other-determined
reservation value."
Consider the level of intended publicity. Reservation values can be
"unannounced" or "announced" to other parties, a neutral third party, the
public, or the world.43 Announced reservation values come in two flavors:
"feigned" 44 and what we might call "sincere." A sincere RV is equal to the
party's self-determined RV, and feigned ones are not.
Raiffa et al. used the term "true reservation value" to refer to what I have
called self-determined RVs, in order to distinguish them from announced
RVs.45 This use of the "true" modifier implies that people have perfect self-
insight, which ignores the possibility of wiggle room. I will use "true
40 Donald Davidson explained in philosophical terms why intentions are conditioned
on unstated beliefs about the future. DAvIDSON, supra note 16, at 100.
41 E-mail from Blake Emerson, Ph.D. Candidate at Yale University, to Noah
Susskind, author (Jan. 11, 2010, 21:40 EST) (on file with author) (phrasing the issue in
these words).
42 MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 17, at 73. Admittedly, an issue reservation
value can effectively stand as a package reservation value if one issue matters so much to
us that we will not accept any resolution that does not satisfy our reservation value on
that one issue.
43 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 122-23.
44 LAx & SEBEN1US, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 121-22.
45 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 122-26.
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reservation value" in a more accurate sense below.
Whether resulting from research, negotiation, fiat, lottery, or whim, all
self-determined, other-determined, and announced reservation values for
either packages or single issues fall under the genera of what we might call
"decided reservation values." In temporal and sometimes epistemological
contrast, there also exists a genera of what I would christen "revealed
reservation values. '46 They are not just what a party decides or announces its
threshold will be, but what that threshold actually turns out to be: "Rory
offered as much as X and Dominique accepted" (or "Dominique eventually
expressed willingness to accept as little as Y but Rory refused"). Though not
independent of psychology, revealed reservation values are by definition
empirically measurable after the fact. Decided RVs are ex ante; revealed RVs
are ex post.
Now, the farthest a party could be pushed, come what may (which the
field currently calls a "reservation value," and which I would re-label a "true
reservation value") is not measurable. Does it even exist? Infinitely many
significant things could happen. What is the least you would take on the
courthouse steps if there were an earthquake? If you won the lottery? If all
the evidence burned?
Revealed reservation values are not necessarily equal to true reservation
values. But while revealed reservation values are sometimes identical to self-
determined reservation values, sometimes they are different. In those
instances, wiggle room exists.47 That is the precise definition of wiggle
room.
Let another neologism, "wiggler," refer to the party or person who
knowingly (but not necessarily deliberately) slides past a self-determined
issue or package reservation value to reach agreement. Let "wrangler" be a
party or person who actively induces wiggling. Notice that because of how
these two terms are defined, there can be a wiggler without a wrangler, but
not a wrangler without a wiggler. And people can be both wigglers and
wranglers at the same time. When all parties wiggle, I would want to label
that a "compromise," an everyday pejorative term the field has struggled to
dissociate from the joint gains of integrative bargaining.48
46 I do not mean to conflate this with the existing economic term "revealed
preference," though I thank Blake Emerson for suggesting it I consider that concept in
order to help refine this one. E-mail from Blake Emerson, supra note 41.
47 Observe that wiggle room is not "salami slicing"-asking for a little more when
consecrating an agreement that all parties have already assented to.
48 E.g., THE CONSENSUs BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 466, 488, 807 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
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A "last best offer" (LBO) is a party's final bid at mutual agreement.
What one party labels its LBO might not be its LBO. Also, despite being
labeled an LBO, a final bid may not be believed by the other party to really
be an LBO.
Rounding out our review of basic negotiation argot, a "target" 49 or
"aspiration value"50 is, as suggested above, the value of an agreement a party
aspires to secure in a negotiation.
We also need a term to label the offers or demands that fail to meet a
self-determined RV but are temptingly close nonetheless. Thomas Schelling,
as well as Fisher, Ury, and Patton, have referenced the Sirens of Homer's
The Odyssey in discussions related to the present topic. 51 Therefore, I will
label these tempting possibilities "siren songs," while jettisoning that label's
pejorative overtones. Some but not all siren songs are LBOs, and not all
LBOs are siren songs.
A party's BATNA is its best relevant course of action if the negotiation
at hand ends in impasse. 52 Even scholarship aimed at clarifying the meaning
of BATNA has confused its definition. 53 According to the term's originators,
the BATNA would be not just an "alternative" but the whole process of
pursuing that alternative, along with all the concomitant benefits and costs.54
These costs include not just transaction costs (like search and information
costs, bargaining costs, opportunity costs, and policing and enforcement
costs), but also the changeover cost of switching to the BATNA. The
changeover and transaction costs of a BATNA can be financial, temporal,
and even psychological. And the fact that BATNAs can incorporate
uncertainties 55 underscores that a BATNA is not just an alternative deal but
the process of pursuing that deal.
49 WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 33, at 42.
50 RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 44.
51 Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 94, 94-103 (1980); FISHER ET AL., supra note 23, at 98; THE ODYSSEY OF
HOMER Book XII, Lines 39-54, 186 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row 1965).
52 FISHER ET AL., supra note 23 coined this term; see also John Nash, Non-
Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS MATHEMATICS 286, 295 (1951) (explaining cooperative
behavior in terms of players' non-cooperative options).
53 E.g., White & Neale, supra note 13, at 379-80.
54 WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING IN DIFFICULT SITUATIONS 21-22
(rev. ed. 1993).
55 E.g., LAx & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 57; RAIFFA,
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 70-77; RAIFFA ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 129-48.
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If b < s, there will be no deal, because the most the buyer is willing to
pay is not enough to satisfy the seller. In this case, there is what some have
called "no possible agreement" (NOPA).56 If s < b, then that is a "zone of
possible agreement" (ZOPA), commonly defined as the range of possible
values the negotiators could potentially agree upon. The existence of a ZOPA
does not guarantee agreement, but if the parties do reach agreement, then-
according to the conventional definition-it can only be within the ZOPA. 57
NOPA and ZOPA are perhaps best understood graphically, so I will critique
their conventional definitions as I build a graphical model of wiggle room.
IV. NOPA AND ZOPA CRITIQUED & WIGGLE ROOM PRESENTED
GRAPHICALLY
It would be impossible and useless to create a model that tries to suggest
all the infinite places at which a revealed or true RV could arrive. But in
some cases it might be possible and useful to model wiggle room by
depicting the probable discrepancy between revealed reservation values and
self-determined reservation values.
To see how, let us graph wiggle room one-dimensionally. Wiggle room
can exist in either of two possible scenarios: when there is a ZOPA and when
there is NOPA. We will start with the former. Here is an example of how a
ZOPA is usually graphed and conceived:
ZOPA: THE ZONE OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT
SELLE R'S RqV BUYERWS RV
(TRADITIONAL PARADIGM) 58
These are crisp, traditionally defined reservation values; they mean to
represent the most the parties are willing to give or take. "The ZOPA is the
56 Wheeler, supra note 14, at 245.
57 E.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 21 (2004).
58 See, e.g., MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 17, at 23.
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set of all possible deals that would be acceptable to both parties." '59
Accordingly, conventional wisdom holds that deals outside this ZOPA are
not possible.60 Even Walton and McKersie, who correctly recognized the
perceptual origins of "resistance points," make that same claim.61 But this
canonical model of the ZOPA, while internally consistent, is descriptively
inaccurate. It assumes that the self-determined reservation values are also
true reservation values. The existence of wiggle room means that sometimes
agreements are possible outside the "zone of possible agreements"! This
contradiction should be corrected. One solution is to say that the boundaries
of the ZOPA are revealed reservation values. But that would be unhelpful
because revealed reservation values do not emerge until the negotiation is
over. A second option would be to admit that the ZOPA is actually bounded
by true reservation values, but since we do not know where they are exactly,
we can use gray areas to show where revealed RVs might fall-relative to
self-determined RVs-as a result of wiggling. The arrows below draw
attention to gray areas I have added to show wiggle room, where revealed
reservation values might lurk.
ZOPA: THE ZONE OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT
4 •1* $4325 $49M
SELLCR's SgLF-DzTIrRMIND RV BUYER'S SIcLF-OTTRMINUO RV
(NEW PARADIGM)
In the second possible scenario, there is not a traditionally-defined
ZOPA. Instead, there is NOPA. Each party's wiggle room could only lie
between that party's self-determined reservation value and the other party's
self-determined reservation value. For example, if s = $20 and b = $10, then
59 Id.; see also, MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 18-22, 107.
60 E.g., LAX & SEBENIUS MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 51; MNOOKIN
ET AL., supra note 57, at 18-22, 107; RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION,
supra note 2, at 45; RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 110;
WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 33, at 43.
61 WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 33, at 42-43. What they called a "settlement
range," Fisher and Ury renamed the "zone of potential agreement." FISHER ET AL,. supra
note 23, at 134.
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there is wiggle room as long as there is a chance that either b's revealed
RV>$10 or s's revealed RV<$20.
SCENARIO 2: NOPA
BuYER'S SsLF-DETERMINED RV SELLER'S SELF-DETERMINED RV$to $20
Paradoxically, if the wiggle room for each of these parties were to
overlap, they might reach agreement even if there were "no possible
agreements." Perhaps, then, we need to redefine NOPA too. Strictly
speaking, there are no possible agreements only when true RVs, not self-
determined RVs, leave no room for possible agreements. But it is impossible
to predefine what the true RVs are. So, we could leave self-determined RVs
as the boundaries of a NOPA, as long as we remember that NOPA does not
quite mean what it purports to mean.
By now it should be clear why I would discourage the custom of
visualizing self-determined RVs as merely "lines" or "points." They can
include an abutting gray area.
For greater graphical precision, we need to transition to two-dimensional
space. What would the x-axis and y-axis represent? Wiggle room is partly a
function of personality: a party's stubbornness, obstinacy, doggedness, or
firmness-or, alternately-amenability, tolerance, or softness. The least
pejorative term might be "flexibility." Psychometricians measure personal
attributes like this with questionnaires, the facial electromyograph, the
electroencephalograph, and functional magnetic resonance imaging62-none
of which we can expect to employ on our counterparts during negotiations.
Therefore we need a measurement one step removed that we can use to
measure uncertainty about wiggling. We can describe and quantify
uncertainty with probability measures, possibility measures, plausibility
62 SHARON S. BREHM, SAUL KASSIN & STEVEN FEIN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 188-89
(6th ed. 2005).
[Vol. 26:1 20111
WIGGLE ROOM
measures, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, or ranking functions. 63 I will
use probability measures, and I will discuss arguments for and against this
choice after illustrating it.
Let us start by constructing a graph showing the wiggle room for one
person who might wiggle in one direction. We can put the possible values of
the agreement (in any kind of units) on the x-axis, with the self-determined
reservation value at one end. On the y-axis we can put the estimated
likelihood that the person would be willing to accept agreements at the x-axis
values. (Or we could instead estimate probabilities relative to the y-value at
the RV.) Whose estimates are used is up to the graph's creator.
Let us graph the wiggle room for s. Suppose $10 is the self-determined
RV, and we estimate that the probability s will accept a deal at that value is
100%. Suppose our other data points are ($9.75, 75%), ($9.50, 50%), and
($9.13, 25%). We get:
SELLER'S WIGGLE ROOM
cc
S 10004w
75%
o J 25%
$r 10 (RV)
PRICE
The gray area is the wiggle room. The first few decrements or increments
away from an RV along the x-axis occupy the majority of the values in play
(where there is wiggle room at all). I suspect that most wiggle room curves
drop precipitously and reach a probability of zero for many x-values. Along a
third axis, one might also show the passage of time, since flexibility can
change.
In some negotiations, it might be useful to sketch wiggle room curves
like this for each party. Discussing the curve that describes our own party's
wiggle room would help its members align. To do so, we could start, if we
are positioned like a seller, by asking ourselves which x-value that is less
63 See generally JOSEPH Y. HALPERN, REASONING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY (2005).
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attractive than our self-determined RV we are only 50% as likely to accept as
no agreement (or 50% as likely to accept as our self-determined RV, if we
are calculating y-values relatively). In doing so, we should presume that we
believed the hypothetical x-value in question was the last best offer. We
could go on to ask ourselves the same question regarding y-values of 25%
and 75%. I chose these percentages arbitrarily. One could also begin with
given x-values and ask about y-values: how likely is it that we would accept
an offer at x1? While probably not a popular exercise, this could be helpful.
And if we saved our 3-D graphs for every negotiation, we could see what the
average curve looked like in different contexts, use this (or a probability
density function built from it) to help us estimate other parties' flexibility
curves, and capitalize. I would conduct laboratory experiments with this goal
if I had the resources.
This representational scheme is useful because the slope of the curve is
determined in part by the flexibility of the party-the attribute we are trying
to model. The steeper the slope, the more inflexible the party. Unfortunately,
the slope's descriptive power is diluted by other factors, like the accuracy of
the estimations. Indeed, the curve's shape illustrates the shortfalls of at least
one of probability's four assumptions about rationality: (1) if one agreement
option is better than another by even the smallest margin, it is preferred, (2)
preferences are transitive, (3) one can always compare complementary
options, and (4) preferences are determined point-wise. 64 The first
assumption is challenged by the fact that the curve will probably look like
steps in some places, because certain values or ranges can become arbitrarily
significant or insignificant. 65 As a mediator, I have encountered plaintiffs
who find the subjective difference between, say, $10 million and $10.1
million to be much less significant than the subjective difference between
$9.9 million and $ 10 million. Concessions perceived to be disproportionately
stingy can even be decreasingly attractive precisely because they surrender
"the smallest margin" of value.
V. WHY WE WIGGLE, OR, How To WRANGLE
From the perspective of a wiggler and a wrangler, I will list and interpret
a menu of wiggle room's causes. Then, I will draw attention to the evidence
most at odds with Fisher et al. and Raiffa et al.'s understandings of
reservation values.
64 Id. at 20-22.
65 WALTON & MCKERSLE, supra note 33, at 25-30.
[Vol. 26:1 20111
WIGGLE ROOM
At the outset, three clarifications are in order. My purpose is to explain
wiggling and wrangling, not justify or condemn them. Second, I think the
more complex a negotiation becomes, the harder (and maybe less
worthwhile) it is to formulate a crisp self-determined RV, and so the less
likely it is that a party can be said to be wiggling. Third, I will continue to
assume an "ancient and commonsense" proposition defended by Donald
Davidson: that the reasons a decisionmaker has in mind when acting, for
acting, can be said to be a kind of "cause" for that action, even if not the only
one. 66 But as we will see in a subsequent section about how people wiggle,
the reasons one has in mind when wiggling might not be why one wiggled.
Now for a list of wiggling's possible causes:
(1) Wiggle room depends on the wiggler's perception that further
improvement to the agreement on the table is impossible67 or will net little
more than a pyrrhic victory. This perception is shaped by the wrangler's
ability to persuade the wiggler that the wrangler's announced reservation
value is sincere, and that it will be equal to her revealed RV as well.68
Convincing theatrics aside, one way to do this is to make a "commitment...
binding, credible, visible, and irreversible" to a specific reservation value.69
Suppose a real estate buyer is trying to prove that his RV is $16,000, which
happens to be $1,000 less than the skeptical seller's announced self-
determined RV. And "suppose the buyer could make an irrevocable and
enforceable bet with some third party, duly recorded and certified, according
to which he would pay for the house no more than $16,000, or forfeit
$5,000."70 Crossing the Rubicon with a commitment like this might convince
the seller to wiggle.
However, alleging that one's self-determined, announced, revealed, and
perhaps even true RVs are identical from the start is not necessarily
conducive to wrangling. Wrangling might be more likely if a would-be
66 DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 3-20.
67 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 274 ("I saw that I had to
get 35 points, but it wasn't possible-the instructions were wrong.").
68 Such persuasion routinely involves deceit, raising ethical questions. WHAT'S
FAIR: ETiCS FOR NEGOTIATORS 65-102 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler
eds., 2004).
69 LAx & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 125. C.f Daniel
Druckman, Visibility and Negotiating Flexibility, 136 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 118 (1996)
(suggesting that the visibility of a negotiation, viz. its location and media coverage, can
affect negotiators' flexibility, with more visibility leading to less flexibility).
70 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, An Essay on Bargaining, in THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
21,24 (2ded. 1980).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
wiggler thinks the would-be wrangler is wiggling too, since perceptions of
fairness can dominate even purely economic exchanges. 71 In ultimatum
bargaining games, for example, many would rather reach impasse than agree
to a deal they perceive to be better for another party than for themselves. 72
(2) Wiggling depends on the attractiveness of BATNAs. Common sense
suggests that a negotiator with a less attractive BATNA is more likely to
wiggle. Its attractiveness depends on things like the agreement(s) presently
on the table, certainty of the BATNA's attainability, personal preferences
about whom to deal with, changeover costs, and perceptions of the other
party's contentment with their BATNA. Even the amount of foreseeable time
between the choice at hand and the BATNA in reserve affects its
attractiveness, which generally declines hyperbolically. 73 (Indeed, parts of
the brain responsible for the sensation of pleasurable excitement light up
when we imagine a monetary reward in the near future but not the distant
future.74)
(3) If someone does not offer us a siren song, we will not wiggle. But
parties do not try to start with siren songs. If they are smart, they start with
moves that take place away-from-the-table and change the playing field in
their favor.75 That includes improving their BATNA and self-determined
RV, shaping other parties' BATNAs and self-determined RVs, and so on.
Parties can continue these moves throughout, but what else happens when we
sit down to the table, in terms of offers and demands along the way to siren
songs?
a. We start with opening gambits. If the other party views yours as
a siren song, they will likely claim more value than they could
have otherwise, and in a zero-sum game, this might mean you
have made a mistake. But opening offers or demands that are too
far from the other party's self-determined or announced RV can
cause a "chilling effect,"'76 leading others to become
disinterested, insulted, or even suspicious that you are bargaining
71 BAZERMAN& NEALE, supra note 17, at 116-25.
72 Werner Gith et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 382-85 (1982).
73 George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and
Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463 (1975).
74 Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and
Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCI. 503-07 (2004).
75 LAX & SEBENIUS, 3D NEGOTIATION, supra note 3, at 91-97.
7 6 THOMPSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 12, at 12.
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in bad faith. A chilling effect can also cause a "boomerang
effect," where a farfetched opening gambit elicits an equally
farfetched counteroffer. 77 The trick, naturally, is to make an
opening gambit that is plenty far from the other party's self-
determined RV, but not too far. If you have good information on
their likely BATNA, you might be able to ballpark their self-
determined RV and make an opening gambit not
counterproductively far from it. If you do not have such
information, it might behoove you to let them make the first
offer, as long as you can quickly counter any farfetched opening
gambit of theirs in order to prevent them from mentally
anchoring on it. 78
b. Depending on the context, moving from a good opening gambit
to a siren song should probably take several exchanges. If you
make mostly large concessions (and your opening gambit was
too generous), you are more likely to skip past the wiggle room
by making an offer that is more attractive to the other party than
their self-determined RV. (Remember how the curve drops
precipitously in the two-dimensional wiggle-room graph.) That
is why the oft-mentioned two-stage persuasion strategies-
making a large request and then a small one, or vice versa 79-
might be too drastic to find the wiggle room. 80 A more nuanced
strategy would be incremental: make larger initial concessions to
signal reasonableness and elicit reciprocity, and follow with
increasingly small concessions to signal, as mentioned in (2), the
approach of an RV.81
(4) Logrolling or "linking" 82 issues might tempt negotiators to wiggle on
one issue in order to get what they want on another, perhaps especially when
talks are mediated by a neutral who, some have argued, can help parties
77 Id.
78 MALHoTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 17, at 31; RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 40.
79 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 37-40 (5th ed. 2009).
80 Besides, these sequential request tactics are only powerful to the extent that they
are not recognized for what they are. Joseph Schwarzwald et al., The Applicability of the
Door-in-the-Face Technique when Established Behavioral Customs Exist, 9 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 577, 585 (1979).
81 RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 48.
82 Id. at 13. 33.
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interpret each other's communications. 83
(5) Decision analysis helps us articulate and quantify the aforementioned
difference between the subjective expected utility of BATNAs and that of
self-determined RVs.84 But this is difficult. 85 One reason is that the
difference between BATNAs and self-determined RVs is the sum of not just
easily quantifiable benefits and costs, but also psychological and subjective
experiences like the changeover cost of "inconvenience." These can be hard
to quantify for at least three reasons: (a) they are nebulous by nature; (b) they
can change; and, (c) finally, people are not as good as they think they are at
"affective forecasting"-predicting how they will feel.86
Midwestern college students predict they would be happier about the
weather and more satisfied with life as a whole if they lived in California, but
surveys of California college students confirm only the former.87 Indeed, if
surveys of people who have actually experienced certain things can validly
be compared to people's estimations of how they would feel if those things
happened to them, we consistently overestimate how various personal and
environmental changes-like air pollution, rainforest depletion, decreased
risk of nuclear war, increased risk of AIDS, changes in income and chronic
health conditions, receiving or being denied tenure, or winning the lottery-
would affect our happiness in the long term. 88 People overestimate how bad
they would feel, and how long they will feel it, "if they lose a job or a
romantic partner, if their candidate loses an important election or their team
loses an important game, if they flub an interview, flunk an exam, or fail a
83 E.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 19 (1987).
84 See generally RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, supra note 2;
RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
85 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 222.
86 George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future
Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 85-86
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS (2007).
87 David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 343
(1998).
88 George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to Environmental
Change, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 52, 66-67 (Max H. Bazerman et al.
eds., 1997).
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contest. ' 89 One study even found that reported happiness levels were
eventually the same for those who got what they wanted as for those who did
not.90 This phenomenon may be due in part to focalism, "whereby people
focus too much on the event in question and not enough on the consequences
of other future events." 91 Another possible cause is presentism, which is "the
tendency for current experience to influence one's views of the past and
future." 92 There is also adaptation, which is the tendency to get less and less
pleasure from the good (also known as habituation or diminishing/declining
marginal utility) or displeasure from the bad.93 However, people's affective
forecasts are more accurate if they are prompted to imagine experiencing not
just the event in question but its surrounding everyday activities.94 Indeed,
people from cultures that emphasize holistic thinking tend to make better
affective forecasts. 95
What does this mean for negotiation and wiggle room? Most
importantly, negotiators do not have a perfect grasp of how hypothetical
outcomes would make them feel, so the subjective expected utility of
assorted BATNAs and RVs will probably include human error that wranglers
can exploit. And, one way we can push for precision in our own affective
forecasts is to force ourselves to think holistically, rather than myopically,
when we imagine hypotheticals throughout the negotiation process.
(6) Self-determined reservation values can be conceived as a personal
standard, and research shows that focusing our attention on ourselves enables
89 GILBERT, supra note 86, at 167. See generally Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The
Trouble With Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE
WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 114,
114-43 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); Timothy Wilson & Daniel T.
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
345 (Mark Zanna ed., 2003).
90 Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 618-24 (1998); BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS: HOW THE CULTURE OF ABUNDANCE ROBS US
OF SATISFACTION 175 (2005).
91 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821 (2000).
92 GILBERT, supra note 86, at 121-39.
93 Id. at 144, 239; Schwartz, supra note 90, at 167-79.
94 See generally Wilson et al., supra note 89.
95 See generally Kent C. H. Lam et al., Cultural Differences in Affective
Forecasting: The Role of Focalism, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1296
(2005).
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self-evaluation according to standards we perceive about what we ought to be
or do. This can be a self-control mechanism that affects our behavior.
96
Inversely, "many experiments have shown that when people are not self-
focused, their actions are often unrelated to their personal standards-self-
awareness is needed for people to reduce disparities between their actions
and their ideals." 97 In one study, a restaurant asked people to pay for their
drinks using just the honor system, and customers left almost three times
more money in total when a picture of two eyes, rather than a picture of
flowers, was behind the deposit box.98 So, a negotiator practicing mindful
self-awareness might be more focused on his or her self-determined
reservation value and thus less likely to wiggle.
(7) Sunk costs can bias decisionmaking 99 and encourage wiggling. 100
However, education about this bias dampens its effect.10 1 I hypothesize that
parties are more likely to wiggle when reminded and concerned about the
sunk costs of negotiation but unaware of the potential for their own sunk cost
bias.
(8) Relationships matter to wiggle room.
a. A longstanding and friendly relationship with other parties might
cause some flexibility. We do favors for our friends, family, and
colleagues. We might also be more likely to trust them when
they say that their announced RV is identical to their self-
determined RV. And, previous negotiations might have taught us
about their (and our) abilities to predict their revealed RVs.
b. Being strangers can cut both ways. If strangers know, suspect, or
hope there is a chance they will negotiate with each other again,
96 See generally SHELLY DUVAL & ROBERT A. WIcKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE
SELF-AWARENESS (Academic Press 1972). See also Frederick X. Gibbons, Self-Attention
and Behavior: A Review and Theoretical Update, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249-303 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990).
97 Paul J. Silvia, Self-Awareness Theory, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (Macmillan 2008), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/
1G2-3045302373.html.
98 Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation In A Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412-14 (2006).
99 See generally ALLAN 1. TEGER, Too MUCH INVESTED To QUIT (1980).
100 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 274 ("We worked so
hard in trying to find a solution .... ).
101 Richard P. Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in
Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOL. Sci. 362 (1990).
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they might wiggle to protect credibility, 10 2or stand firm to avoid
setting an undesirable precedent. If strangers do not anticipate
future interactions, they might wiggle because they do not fear
setting a bad precedent, or stand firm because they do not feel
there is a personal relationship to protect.
c. Disliking the other party can cut either way too. We might be
less inclined to give in to someone unsavory, or instead we might
wiggle to end the interaction faster.
(9) It was discussed earlier that commitments-announced and
reinforced reservation values, essentially-can help to convince others to
wiggle because we will not. Why? Especially in the context of principal-
agent tensions, negotiators might fear that wiggling risks damaging
relationships and reputations among those on the same side of the bargaining
table. So helping the would-be wiggler save face would make wrangling
easier. This is because egos matter in negotiations. 10 3 They affect the
emergence of wiggle room in at least two ways. A wiggler's self-esteem
might not permit wiggling if it would be embarrassing. On the other hand,
the same negotiator might fear reporting a "failure" to reach agreement.
Sometimes not coming to an agreement is in a party's best interest, 10 4 but
unfortunately it is still not uncommon to view stalemate as a kind of failure.
Ego can thus both encourage and deter wiggling and wrangling.
(10) Parties are probably more likely to wiggle when a negotiation's
length leads to fatigue, stress, fear, excitement, or boredom. Length is also
associated with the momentum of a negotiation-the inertia and rhythm of a
continuous give-and-take that can lead parties to agreements they would not
accept if the negotiation were more syncopated. So, nonstop negotiation
might increase your chances of wrangling others.
(11) Daniel Shapiro points out that identity matters to negotiations. 10 5
This, too, has consequences for the emergence of wiggle room. Wigglers
might not want to be seen (or see themselves) either as pushovers or too
stubborn to accept a worthwhile but subpar agreement. Convincing those on
the other side that you see them as reasonable and pragmatic, rather than
pushovers, might help you to wrangle them.
102 RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 119.
103 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU
NEGOTIATE 95-114 (2006).
104 LAX & SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR, supra note 3, at 55.
105 Daniel L. SHAPIRO, Identity: More than Meets the "I," in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 225, 225-30
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider et al. eds., 2006).
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(12) In 1979, Khaneman and Tversky demonstrated some now-
famous biases pertaining to risk aversion. When they offered subjects a
hypothetical choice between a guaranteed gain of $3,000 or an 80% chance
of $4,000, most subjects chose the smaller but certain gain. When the
experimenters offered subjects a hypothetical choice between a guaranteed
loss of $3,000 and an 80% chance of losing $4,000, most chose the uncertain
but potentially larger loss.1 06
Why are we averse to uncertainty in negotiations? White and Neale
suggested that its psychological cost owes to our need for structure."7 They
cite Kruglanski and Freund, who wrote:
The need for structure is the need to have some knowledge on a given
topic, any knowledge as opposed to confusion and ambiguity. A need for
structure once aroused is assumed to have an inhibiting or freezing
influence on the hypothesis-generation process because the generation of
alternative hypotheses endangers the existing hypothesis or structure. 10 8
If a recently floated deal is seen by a negotiator as a certain gain-even
though it is less than the self-determined RV-it might be preferable to a
less-certain BATNA that leads to more questions.10 9 But a negotiator might
also see a BATNA as more certain than an unenforceable agreement with an
untrustworthy party. Uncertain gains cut both ways.
The same holds for aversion to loss. A defendant negotiating a civil
settlement might prefer to risk a huge verdict in court than suffer a certain,
but less fiscally damaging, settlement. 1 10 On the other hand, a defendant who
sees a negotiated loss as less certain than an inevitable but less-injurious
BATNA may have some wiggle room after all.
Risk aversion can also stem from aversion to anticipated post-decision
regret" 1-we avoid risks that we fear we will later regret. Anticipated regret
depends on post-decision regret's foreseeable causes, which include:
106 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions
Under Risk, 47 EcONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
107 White & Neale, supra note 13, at 384.
108 Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay-
Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Numerical
Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448, 450 (1983).
109 BAZERMAN &NEALE, supra note 17, at 34-35.
110 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 161.
111 Marcel Zeelenberg & Jane Beattie, Consequences of Regret Aversion 2:
Additional Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making, 72 ORG. BEHAV. &
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a. Whether the decision was something we did. People say they
would expect to regret acts of commission more than
omission. 12 (When asked to reflect on their past, though, people
report regretting acts of omission more.) 113
b. Whether we were responsible for the decision. We feel more
regret for things we feel responsible for. 1 14
c. How nearly we lost out on something preferable. We regret
missing the mark by a slim margin more than we regret missing
by a wide one.11 5 This "nearness effect" goes hand in hand with
(d).
d. Whether we engage in "upward" or "downward" "counterfactual
thinking"--thoughts about how things could have gone better or
worse. Medvec et al. found that silver medalists report
experiencing more regret than bronze medalists because silver
medalists focus on the more salient (upward) counterfactual of
nearly missing gold than the (downward) counterfactual of
missing bronze.1 16 The bronze medalists, who reported feeling
less regret, engaged more in downward counterfactual thinking,
and thereby felt grateful that they medaled at all instead of
coming in fourth.
HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 63, 77-78 (1997); Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of
Regret Aversion: Effects of Feedback on Risky Decision Making, 65 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148, 156-58 (1996); llana Ritov, Probability of Regret:
Anticipation and Uncertainty Resolution in Choice, 66 ORG. BEHAv. AND HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 228, 235-36 (1996); Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in
Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation Example, 63 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 87, 94-97 (1995).
112 Daniel Kalneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 ScI.
AM. 160, 170-73 (1982).
113 Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What,
When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379, 381 (1995).
114 See Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Temporal Pattern to the
Experience of Regret, 67 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 362-65 (1994); Marcel
Zeelenberg et al., Reconsidering the Relation Between Regret and Responsibility, 74
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 254, 267-72 (1998).
115 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 203 (Daniel Khaneman et al. eds.,
1982).
116 Victoria Husted Medvec et al., When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and
Satisfaction Among Olympic Medalists, 69 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 606 (1995).
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So, people are more likely to wiggle if they fear the regret of wiggling
less than they fear the regret of reaching impasse. Upward counterfactual
thinking, a feeling of responsibility, the nearness effect, and acts of
commission all lead to greater post-decision regret. A wrangler could try to
capitalize on all of these by emphasizing to us, respectively, (1) why the siren
song is better than our BATNA, (2) why this decision is ours to make, (3)
how near the siren song is to our self-determined RV, and (4) the ways in
which reaching impasse is an act of omission on our part.
(13) Anticipating or making hard trade-offs between two more or less
equally attractive (or equally unattractive) alternatives tends to worsen mood
rather than improve it. 117 Given that we face this kind of choice when
deciding between our BATNA and a siren song, does an attendant bad mood
make us more or less likely to wiggle? Self-determined RVs can be seen as
personal goals ("I will reject anything worse than X"), and the evidence
about endeavoring to meet personal goals suggests that a bad mood makes us
more likely to wiggle. Distress undermines smokers' attempts to quit
smoking, even when other factors like demographics and self-efficacy are
controlled for.118 People prioritize mood-repair over other goals when they
are in a bad mood, making them more liable to seek short-term pleasure in
things like high-calorie foods.1 19 Therefore, weighing a self-determined RV
against a siren song can worsen mood, and a worsened mood is more
conducive to wiggling (if it's seen as a source of pleasure).
Not only does a bad mood seem to lend itself to wiggling, but people
also wiggle in order to avoid feeling bad. Reported expectations about
negative affect (like shame or embarrassment) were responsible for causing
117 SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 125. See also Mary Frances Luce et al., Emotional
Decisions:Tradeoff Difficulty and Coping in Consumer Choice, in I MONOGRAPHS J.
CONSUMER RES. (Deborah Roedder John ed., 2001). at 126. "[D]ecision makers in this
experiment were more likely to choose each of three different types of avoidant option in
the more threatening high trade-off difficulty environment." Id. at 126. "[S]ubjects asked
to choose among five cars defined in terms of the high trade-off-difficulty attributes
reported experiencing significantly more negative emotion than did subjects asked to
choose among five cars defined in terms of the low trade-off-difficulty attributes"). Id. at
65.
118 Paul M. Cinciripini et al., The Effects of Depressed Mood on Smoking Cessation:
Mediation by Postcessation Self-Efficacy, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 292,
298-99 (2003).
119 Diane M. Tice et al., Emotional Distress Regulation Takes Precedence Over
Impulse Control: If You Feel Bad, Do It, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53-54
(2001).
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clients to miss their first scheduled psychotherapy appointments despite
strong intentions to keep them. 120
Admittedly, it might be argued that the food and drug-based studies
about mood are not applicable to wiggle room in other contexts, because our
bodies do not need to make deals in the same way they might need food or
nicotine. So consider instead the mood-related psychological factor at work
in what might be the most extreme instance of wiggling: confessing to first-
degree murder when innocent. In the case of the rape and murder of the
Central Park jogger, a particularly publicized example, five innocent
teenagers confessed to the crimes-four while being videotaped. 12' In fact,
about 25% of all convicted prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence had
previously given false confessions, incriminating statements, or guilty
pleas. 122 One would think that during a police interrogation, people's self-
determined reservation value is something at least as self-preservationist as,
"I will not confess to a crime I did not commit." Even when the stakes are as
high as life imprisonment, people wiggle.
Kassin offers two explanations. One is that sometimes innocent
suspects confess as an act of "compliance" in order to escape the
fatigue, despair, and food and sleep-deprivation involved in police
interrogations. 123 I have already mentioned the potential consequences
of fatigue, so here I want to focus on despair. The police interrogation
tactics recommended by Inbau et al. are now claimed to be "the most
widely used approach[.. .]in the world."' 2 4 These tactics would read
like "Negotiation Hardball 101" if reworked and ported from
interrogations to negotiations:
120 Paschal Sheeran et al., Increasing Attendance for Psychotherapy:
Implementation Intentions and the Self-Regulation of Attendance-Related Negative
Affect, 75 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 853, 861 (2007).
121 Saul Kassin, False Confessions and the Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002,
at A3 1; Susan Saulny, Why Confess to What You Didn't Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002
§ 4, at5.
122 Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: False Confessions,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Aug. 30,
2010).
123 Kassin, supra note 121, at A31.
124 John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., Company Information,
http://www.reid.com/r-about.html (last visited Sep. 8, 2010).
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1. Confront the suspect with assertions of his or her guilt. 2. Develop
'themes' that appear to justify or excuse the crime. 3. Interrupt all
statements of innocence and denial. 4. Overcome all the suspect's
objections to the charges. 5. Keep the increasingly passive suspect from
tuning out. 6. Show sympathy and understanding, and urge the suspect to
tell all. 7. Offer the suspect a face-saving explanation for his or her guilty
action. 8. Get the suspect to recount the details of the crime. 9. Convert the
statement into a full written confession. 125
When brought to bear on negotiations, these hardball tactics, like
interruption, might increase the chances of wrangling other parties by
increasing their sense of despair. In mediation, however, they may
unproductively escalate conflict. And Mnookin recounts how Anatoli
Sharansky withstood their tortuous extremes at the hands of the KGB by
demonizing his captors, viewing every interaction as a zero-sum game,
moralizing, and remembering the potential ripple effects of wiggling. 126 In
any case, the evidence on despair and false confessions suggests that the food
and drug-related studies about mood's effect on wiggling may be applicable
to negotiation.
(14) Kassin's second explanation for false confessions is that,
because of social pressure, innocent suspects can "internalize" the belief that
they are guilty, 12 7 especially if they lack a clear memory of the event in
question or are presented with false inculpatory evidence. 128 This
internalization relates to memories of crimes rather than memories of
reservation values, but if the latter can be influenced like the former, perhaps
negotiators are more likely to wiggle if they cannot refer (or be held
accountable) to something that documents their self-determined RV. Also, if
as a wrangler you can present evidence suggesting that the other party's self-
determined RV is not what they thought it was, you increase your chances of
wrangling them. Perhaps a would-be wiggler's best protections against these
125 FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(4th ed. 2001), as summarized in BREHM ET AL., supra note 62, at 451.
126 ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN
TO FIGHT 36-49 (2010).
127 RIcHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATrERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES,
PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA 155-56, 165-75 (1994).
128 Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 126-
28 (1996).
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last two causes flow from the following research about self-control and
personal goal implementation.
(15) Mark Muraven and Roy Baumeister have shown that self-
control, as a psychological resource, is limited and can be depleted
temporarily. Evidence suggests that (1) all of someone's self-regulation
draws from a fimite reservoir of resoluteness and self-control, and (2) self-
regulation is like a muscle in that it temporarily tires.12 9 Because of this
tiring, a person's ability to self-regulate decreases as they exercise the
"muscle" over an extended period. 130 And, if one activity depletes that
reservoir of self-control, less will be available during a subsequent activity.
From these two implications come two predictions. One is that parties'
ability to resist a siren song will decrease over time. Leaving a siren song on
the table would give it what Schelling would call a continuous "time profile,"
as distinguished from a random or a cyclical presentation. 13 1 Mischel's
classic studies on resistance to temptation showed that spontaneous attention
to enticing stimuli (with a continuous time profile) can undermine goal-
achievement. 132 (We do not know roughly how long it takes for parties in
different negotiating contexts to experience this effect, or how this theory
brushes up against the effectiveness of "exploding" offers that threaten to
expire after a known deadline.) The second prediction is that depleting self-
regulation on one issue in dispute might tap out self-regulatory resources for
others. For this reason, and as an interesting caveat to (4) above, strategically
taking up issues in series might create more wiggle room on the later ones
than logrolling several at a time.
(16) Gollwitzer summarizes studies showing that when it comes to
accomplishing our goals-either to do something or not-success rates
increase when we formulate and share our intentions specific to where, when,
129 Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited
Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 247-49
(2000).
130 Kathleen D. Vohs & Todd F. Heatherton, Self-Regulatory Failure: A Resource-
Depletion Approach, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 249, 249-52 (2000).
131 Schelling, supra note 51, at 106.
132 Walter Mischel & Ebbe B. Ebbeson, Attention in Delay of Gratification, 16 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 329, 333-37 (1970); Walter Mischel & Charlotte J.
Patterson, Effective Plans For Self-Control in Children, in 11 MINNESOTA SYMPOSIUM ON
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 199, 201-30 (W. Andrew Collins ed., 1978); Charlotte J. Patterson
& Walter Mischel, Effects of Temptation-Inhibiting and Task-Facilitating Plans on Self-
Control, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 209, 213-17 (1976); Walter Mischel et al.,
Delay of Gratification in Children, 244 SCI. 933, 935-38 (1989).
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and how we will implement them. 133 Framing these in an if-then format
especially helps improve follow-through.134
For example, he mentions a study that asked female subjects to do breast
self-examinations within the next month. The treatment group was asked to
write down when and where they would do this. The control group was not.
Those with low motivation to do the task were then winnowed from the total
pool of subjects. Almost 100% of the remaining women in the treatment
group did the exam. In the control group, only 53% did. 135
This suggests that if negotiators want to bind themselves to the mast like
Odysseus, they should write down when, where, and how they will not
wiggle, and they should share this with a confidant or other members of their
party. This practice also helps avoid the problem of internalization mentioned
above; it is harder to convince someone that his or her self-determined RV
was X if he or she can peek at a note saying it was Y, especially because the
deliberative process behind writing it probably helped cement a memory of
it.
(17) Group dynamics play a role. Consider that a deal below your
self-determined RV can appear either riskier than your BATNA, less risky,
or equally risky. Some evidence suggests that groups tend to take greater
risks than individuals do.136 Other studies suggest that individuals' decisions
are riskier. I37 Reconciling these two discrepant sets of studies is a third
demonstrating "group polarization"-where group processes exaggerate the
aggregate initial leaning of the group.1 38 So, a group decisionmaking process
can affect whether a party will wiggle or accept impasse.
133 Peter M. Gollwitzer, Implementation Intentions, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 493
(1999).
134 Gabriele Oettingen et al., Effective Self-Regulation of Goal Attainment, 33 INT'L
J. EDUC. RES. 705, 725-27, (2000) (discussing Experiment 3).
135 E.g., Gollwitzer, supra note 133, at 496.
136 Dorwin Cartwright, Risk Taking by Individuals and Groups: An Assessment of
Research Employing Choice Dilemmas, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 361 (1971);
James Arthur Finch Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Involving
Risk (1961) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/11330 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
137 Robert E. Knox & R. Kirk Safford, Group Caution at the Race Track, 12 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 317, 317-23 (1976).
138 Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 134 (1969); Dave G. Myers & Helmut Lamm,
The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 602, 619 (1976).
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(18) There has been plenty of research on what makes
communications persuasive. For an engaged audience, a longer message is
more persuasive when its length owes to strong supporting arguments, 139 and
less persuasive if the length owes to weak or redundant arguments.140 If you
can give a lot of strong and unique reasons for why the other party should
wiggle, sharing those improves your chances of wrangling them. A litany of
weak reasons reduces those chances.
(19) Inflated self-determined reservation values can lead to wiggling.
In a laboratory setting, Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett found that more often than
not, people set reservation values for themselves that were much higher than
their BATNAs--even when they had no changeover or transaction costs, or a
valueless BATNA! 141 White and Neale echo Walton and McKersie in
reporting that parties sometimes anchor self-determined reservation values
on target agreements instead of their BATNAs, confirming Fisher and Ury's
fear. Take, "for example, [a party's thought that] 'I would like to get $50 for
my bike, but if I have to, I will settle at $40."'White and Neale say:
Within this context, the target (in this case, $50) is just as important an
anchor for the negotiator, if not more so, than the reservation price ($40).
The literature on cognitive anchoring (see Khaneman, Slovic, and Tversky,
142
1982) argues that individuals will adopt the most salient, available anchor
and fail to adjust subsequent judgments adequately away from that anchor.
It is easy to imagine that the negotiator's illusions of optimism and143 144
control as well as the overconfidence bias will lead the negotiator to
139 See Stephen G. Harkins & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Source Magnification of
Cognitive Effort on Attitudes: An Information-Processing View, 40 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 401,412 (1981).
140 James Friedrich et al., Argument Integration and Attitude Change: Suppression
Effects in the Integration of One-Sided Arguments That Vary in Persuasiveness, 22
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 179, 187-91 (1996). See generally Stephen G.
Harkins & Richard E. Petty, Information Utility and the Multiple Source Effect, 52 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 260 (1987).
141 Pinkley et al., supra note 11.
142 KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 115.
143 Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 195 (1988).
144 Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of
the Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REv. 395, 407-12 (1978).
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anchor more heavily on what he or she would like to get (the target) than on
what he or she is willing to accept (the reservation price).145
Wiggle room might therefore be discovered in the 11 th hour when anchor-
inflated reservation values deflate as parties find themselves stuck between
Scylla and Charybdis.
(20) Consider institutional factors.
a. Let us begin with institutionalized incentive structures-say, for
lawyers involved in settlement negotiations over a civil suit.
Mnookin et al. point out that since many plaintiff attorneys take
a percentage of settlements, a cost-benefit analysis might
eventually indicate to them that continued negotiations offer
diminishing marginal returns. 14 6 On the other hand, a defense
counsel who is paid by the hour might be incentivized to draw
out the negotiation as long as possible, 147 which might mean not
wiggling at all. Different incentive structures are part of what
Mnookin et al. identify as the tension between principals and
agents in negotiations.
Many agents are too selfless to allow such incentive structures to
influence them. However, studies show that realtors tend to get higher than
average prices when they sell their own homes. Mnookin et al. suggest that
this is because the realtors know they will enjoy 100%--not just 5% or
100/o-of their additional work's benefit.148
b. Wheeler notes that in professional sports negotiations, parties
often have interlocking BATNAs because they are bound
together contractually.1 49 Moreover, negotiations in this context
are particularly adversarial, he says, for several reasons:
opportunities for creative deal-structuring are limited, salary is
the maj or issue, players associate their salaries with their
identity, ambitious agents introduce inflated reservation values,
145 WHITE & NEALE, supra note 13, at 385-86.
146 MNooK1N ET AL., supra note 57, at 75-76.
147 Id.
148 R. C. Rutherford et al., Conflicts Between Principals and Agents: Evidence From
Residential Brokerage, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 641-65 (2005) (suggesting that agent-
owned houses sell at a price premium of 4.5%); see also Dinah Wisenberg Brin, Real-
Estate Brokers Get a Higher Price When Selling Own Homes, Study Finds, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 19, 1999, at B3E. However, might buyers place a higher value on a house owned by
a real-estate agent, because they presume it was chosen, maintained, and priced well?
149 Wheeler, supra note 14, at 245-46.
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and comparability (as part of a search for objective criteria) is
limited because other players' salaries are not strictly merit-
based. Wheeler says that negotiations between players, their
agents, and professional sports teams sometimes begin with
parties setting reservation values that create NOPA deliberately!
He says both sides intend to transform this NOPA into a ZOPA
through what I would call wiggling and wrangling.150
This list of wiggle room's causes could go on and on. Parties' time
preferences can change due to mere impatience or low blood-sugar levels.
Cultural influences, and logistical constraints on principal-agent negotiations,
might matter for wiggle room too.
Let us pause to reflect on how parts of this list have implications for the
understandings of reservation values advanced by Fisher and Raiffa. Recall
that despite their differences, the locomotive assumption behind both was
that cognition precedes behavior. Negotiators' interests are thought to be
knowable or discoverable (at least to themselves) and static between the start
of bilateral dialogue and the end of the negotiation, so notwithstanding
reprioritization of interests during pre-dialogue template creation, Fisher and
Raiffa agree that self-discovery and self-analysis about interests should and
will precede, rather than follow, consensus or impasse.
I am not confident that the preceding section disproves this-that not just
positions at the frontiers of the ZOPA, but interests themselves, are
unforeseeably fungible. There is a significant difference between settling for
$2.49 million instead of $2.5 million, on the one hand, and realizing that you
want an apology instead of just money. But by showing us how far we are
willing to go to get what we want, wiggling might reveal that we did not rank
or weigh our interests accurately-that we got the "expected" part of one or
more subjective expected utilities wrong. And perhaps more importantly,
parts of the research I have presented highlight the half of the cognition-
action feedback loop left underemphasized in Fisher and (especially) Raiffa's
brilliant work. The aforementioned discussions of affective forecasting,
perceptions of fairness, relationships, identities, uncertainty, regret, negative
mood due to difficult choices, and self-control regarding temptation, in
particular, suggest that we come to learn how much we really want
something by what we do when we negotiate. That is self-discovery through
negotiation, not just in preparation for it. To the extent that wiggling reveals
positions we had previously sworn off, wigglers might be surprised by how
important something really is to them, and as John Forester once told me,
150 Id. at 245-47.
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surprise "tells you something about how your previous thinking has been
limiting you.'' The next section helps unfold this idea that we might learn
some things about ourselves only by observing our negotiation behavior.
VI. How WE WIGGLE
In addition to why, there is also the question of how. In particular, if
people are tempted to wiggle, what psychological processes facilitate it?
Despite the aforementioned difficulty of distinguishing some instances of
calculated wiggling and other RV recalibration, it seems obvious that
wiggling can flow from deliberate re-analysis. In such cases, wiggling's net
benefits are reappraised as outweighing that of impasse. Because allowing
others to see us cave can work in our favor, in those contexts a cost-benefit
analysis can even be said to occasionally tip in wiggling's favor.
In other cases wiggling just happens. People find themselves wiggling,
and then they align their cognitions with that behavior. In such instances,
there is a discrepancy between what people intended and what they do. A
discrepancy between cognition and behavior is the focus of a well-
established body of psychological evidence and theory. At its foundation is
Leon Festinger, whose "cognitive dissonance theory"'152 suggests that "a
powerful motive to maintain cognitive consistency [between cognition and
behavior] can give rise to irrational and sometimes maladaptive behavior." 153
Granted, cognitive dissonance theory only applies to wiggling if wiggling
can be conceived as a behavior, and only if self-determined reservation
values are cognitions that behave like attitudes in some relevant ways. I will
assume as much. If wiggling creates an inconsistency between our cognitions
and behavior, we might seek to resolve resulting tension by shaping or
reshaping our cognitions accordingly.
For example, Festinger and James Merrill Carlsmith found that people
sometimes align their attitudes with their behavior ex post facto if there is
insufficient justification for that behavior. 154 Three findings of this study are
151 Interview with John Forester, Professor of City and Regional Planning, Cornell
U., in Cambridge, Mass. (May 15, 2009).
152 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
153 BREHM ET AL., supra note 62, at 214. This theory would thus label acting before
cogitating "irrational and sometimes maladaptive," adjectives whose pejorative character
I do not endorse or dispute in this paper.
154 Leon Festinger & James M. Carismith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 209 (1959).
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particularly worth noting. One is that people can be made to revise their
attitudes (and perhaps their reservation values) without even being engaged
in direct communication about them. A second is that the study contradicted
the commonsense presumption that greater attitude change is elicited by
greater rewards. 155 Third, the subjects were not aware of this retroactive
change. 156 The implication for wiggle room is that especially when there was
weak justification for wiggling, wigglers might delude themselves into
thinking that they did not wiggle after all, and that their reservation value
was not where it actually was.
Studies have also shown that we change our attitudes after the fact in
order to justify our suffering. Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills confirmed
what cognitive dissonance theory would predict: investing in something that
proves disappointing causes discomfort or anxiety. 157 This can be relieved by
adjusting our attitudes. Embarrassment, time, money, and pain are all
unpleasant commitments people feel a need to justify. 158 This helps explain
how, as noted above, suffering can help cause wiggling. It suggests that
people might convince themselves after wiggling that their decision to
wiggle was a good one, even (or especially) if it involved suffering. Here
again, cognition flows from behavior; the tail wags the dog.
In addition to research about justifying attitude-discrepant behavior,
there is another branch of cognitive dissonance theory that explains how we
justify difficult decisions. After making a difficult choice between two
attractive options, people tend to rationalize their choice by exaggerating the
positive attributes of the option they chose and the negative attributes of the
option they eschewed. Jack Brehm asked female subjects to rate assorted
consumer products, ostensibly as part of market research, and then he gave
them a choice between two products they had rated evenly.159 When re-
evaluating the products after their choice, subjects revised their evaluations
in ways that supported it. What is more, this phenomenon has been observed
in numerous contexts. People think it more likely that a horse will win a race
after they have placed a bet on it.160 People are more optimistic about the
155 BREHM ET AL., supra note 62, at 216.
156 Id.
157 Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Likingfor
a Group, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 177-80 (1959). However, the desire for
group inclusion might not find an analog in negotiations.
158 BREHM ET AL., supra note 62, at 217.
159 Jack W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in Desirability of Alternatives, 52 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 387 (1956).
160 Robert E. Knox & James A. Inkster, Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time, 8 J.
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likelihood their preferred political candidate will win after they have
submitted their ballots. 161 If wigglers chose a siren song over their BATNA,
they might later justify that decision by emphasizing the positive aspects of
the siren song and the negative aspects of the BATNA, while de-emphasizing
the negative aspects of the siren song and the positive aspects of the
BATNA.
Subsequent research re-examining cognitive dissonance found that four
conditions are necessary for the arousal of dissonance. After the initial
behavior, there must be (1) an unwanted negative consequence; 162 (2) a
feeling of personal responsibility, including both a perception of choice 163
and the foreseeability of the negative consequences; 164 (3) physiological
arousal as a reaction to this situation; 165 and finally, (4) the attribution of that
physiological arousal to the behavior. 166 All four conditions can surround the
act of wiggling, so cognitive dissonance theory is not ruled out. However, we
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 322 (1968).
161 Dennis T. Regan & Martin Kilduff, Optimism About Elections: Dissonance
Reduction at the Ballot Box, 9 POL. PSYCHOL. 101, 104-07 (1988).
162 Joel Cooper et al., Mistreatment of an Esteemed Other as a Consequence
Affecting Dissonance Reduction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 224, 231-33
(1974). But see Eddie Harmon-Jones et al., Evidence That the Production of Aversive
Consequences Is Not Necessary to Create Cognitive Dissonance, 70 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 13-15 (1996).
163 Darwyn E. Linder et al., Decision Freedom as a Determinant of the Role of
Incentive Magnitude in Attitude Change, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 252
(1967).
164 George R. Goethals et al., Role of Foreseen, Foreseeable, and Unforeseeable
Behavioral Consequences in the Arousal of Cognitive Dissonance, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1179, 1183-85 (1979).
165 Roger A. Elkin & Michael R. Leippe, Physiological Arousal, Dissonance, and
Attitude Change: Evidence for a Dissonance-Arousal Link and a "Don't Remind Me"
Effect, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 55, 65 (1986); Robert T. Croyle & Joel
Cooper, Dissonance Arousal: Physiological Evidence, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 782, 788-89 (1983).
166 Mark P. Zanna & Joel Cooper, Dissonance and the Pill: An Attribution
Approach to Studying the Arousal Properties of Dissonance, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 703, 703-09 (1974); Thane S. Pittman, Attribution ofArousal as a Mediator in
Dissonance Reduction, 11 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 61-63 (1975); Mary
E. Losch & John T. Cacioppo, Cognitive Dissonance May Enhance Sympathetic Tonus,
but Attitudes Are Changed to Reduce Negative Affect Rather than Arousal, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 289, 300-04 (1990).
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must bear in mind that not everyone cares about being cognitively
consistent.167
There have been some important challenges to cognitive dissonance
theory. Studies by Daryl Bern suggest that the attitude change results not
because of a need to reduce internal tension or justify our action, but because
we sometimes infer how we feel from what we have done. 168 Fazio et al.
have helped reconcile Bern's explanation with Festinger's. They argue that
Festinger-inspired cognitive dissonance theory might be best at explaining
situations where there is a high level of discrepancy between attitudes and
behaviors, whereas Bem's self-perception theory is better for explaining
situations where there is a low level of discrepancy. 169 In terms of wiggling,
this discrepancy would be the difference between the revealed and self-
determined reservation values. A second challenge to cognitive dissonance
theory comes from impression-management theory, which holds that we are
motivated to appear but not necessarily be consistent. 170 This theory is
weakened by countervailing evidence that people change their attitudes to
reduce dissonance even when there is no one to make an impression on, such
as when attitudes are reported anonymously. 171 A third challenge-really
more supplemental than oppositional-comes from self-esteem theory,
according to which our behaviors can arouse dissonance because they
threaten our sense of ourselves, making us feel guilty, insincere, or
hypocritical, and motivating us to modify our attitude or behavior.' 72 Indeed,
167 Robert B. Cialdini et al., Preference for Consistency: The Development of a
Valid Measure and the Discovery of Surprising Behavioral Implications, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 318, 325 (1995).
168 E.g., Daryl J. Bern, An Experimental Analysis of Self-Persuasion, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 214-18 (1965).
169 Russell H. Fazio et al., Dissonance and Self-perception: An Integrative View of
Each Theory's Proper Domain of Application, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 464,
476-78 (1977).
170 James T. Tedeschi et al., Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or Public
Spectacle?, 26 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 685, 690 (1971); Roy F. Baumeister, A Self-
Presentational View of Social Phenomena, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 8-11 (1982).
171 Roy F. Baumeister & Dianne M. Tice, Role of Self-Presentation and Choice in
Cognitive Dissonance Under Forced Compliance: Necessary or Sufficient Causes?, 46 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 12 (1984).
172 Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 103-26 (Eddie
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); Jeff Stone et al., When Exemplification Fails:
Hypocrisy and the Motive for Self-Integrity, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 54, 62-
63 (1997).
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Claude Steele suggests that a situation that produces dissonance creates a
process of self-affirmation to revalidate our sense of ourselves. He says this
revalidation can be accomplished in ways other than by resolving the
dissonance.173 For example, subjects who receive positive feedback about
their personality before making a difficult choice are less likely to exhibit a
postdecision change in attitudes. 174 If self-affirmation efforts do not take,
they will not prevent the arousal of dissonance later. 175 So, wigglers who
receive validation are less likely to rationalize later.
If we return to Raiffa and Fisher's treatments of reservation values and
zoom out, we see that they emphasize how cognition drives behavior. Studies
cited in this last section suggest that sometimes, and to some extent, behavior
can drive cognition. We have seen that small payoffs, suffering, difficult
decisions, and self-affirmation can all cause the tail to wag the dog.176 Our
descriptive account of reservation values-and the spillover effects on other
foundational negotiation concepts like the ZOPA-should reflect that. The
wiggle room model can reflect it better than the canonical ones because
unlike the latter, it does not mix prescription with description by assuming
that self-determined reservation values delimit the realm of possibilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Glen Beaman joked, "Stubbornness does have its helpful features. You
always know what you'll be thinking tomorrow."' 177 Wiggle room arises out
of the fact that sometimes our revealed reservation values are not what we
thought they would be. Viewed from the opposite angle, wiggle room is
about being persuasive and getting someone else to acquiesce while claiming
173 Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of
the Self, in 21 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261, 283-302
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1988).
174 Claude M. Steele et al., Self-Image Resilience and Dissonance: The Role of
Affirmational Resources, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 891, 893 (1993).
175 Adam D. Galinsky et al., The Reinstatement of Dissonance and Psychological
Discomfort Following Failed Affirmations, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 123, 141-45
(2000).
176 Organizations rationalize retrospectively, too. Karl E. Weick, Sources of Order
in Underorganized Systems: Themes in Recent Organizational Theory, in
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND INQUIRY: THE PARADIGM REVOLUTION 106, 110-11
(Yvonna S. Lincoln ed., 1985).
177 WorldofQuotes: Glen Beaman Quotes, www.worldofquotes.com/author/Glen-
Beaman/l/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
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more for yourself than would seem possible given the parties' self-
determined reservation values. I have tried to define wiggle room and discuss
its impact on negotiation analysis, including Fisher and Raiffa's dominant
but distinguishable approaches to reservation values. I have listed
explanations for why and how wiggle room emerges. I have translated these
into predictions about what tactics and factors would help negotiators claim
the most possible value for themselves, and help prevent counterparts from
wrangling them during the distributive bargaining that, at least, closes many
negotiations. I have left unanswered such questions as which wrangling or
wiggling tactics are unethical, and when it is wise or advisable to wiggle or
wrangle. I also have not attempted to analyze how wiggle room theory
interacts with some broader concepts like power.
Wiggle room is all around us. It remains to be seen whether we will use
it to our advantage, and if we can determine when doing so is appropriate.
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